I. Introduction
Sub-Saharan Africa is home to some of the poorest and least developed countries in the world. According to the 2006 edition of the United Nations" annual Human Development Index (HDI), only three of the world"s 38 least developed countries lay outside of this wretched region. The average HDI score of sub-Saharan countries was 0.472, well below the world average of 0.741 and pitiful in comparison with the OECD average of 0.923 and Norway"s top score of 0.965.
1 Poor living standards, illiteracy, malnutrition and widespread disease are too often the norm south of the Sahara. Clearly, encouraging development in this region is a task of utmost importance and great urgency.
One way intended to promote better living standards has been through development aid. In most scholarly and policy discussions, the terms aid, development aid and foreign aid refer to Official Development Assistance (ODA), data about which are collected and published by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. According to the Committee"s criteria, financial assistance is classified under ODA if it is disbursed by official agencies, has the promotion of economic development and welfare as its main objective, and involves grants or concessional loans 2 with at least a 25 percent grant element (Cassen et al., 1994) . Based on the identity of the immediate donor, ODA can be classified as bilateral or multilateral. Bilateral assistance is administered by agencies of donor governments, whereas multilateral aid is funded by wealthy countries and allocated by international financial institutions, such as the World Hlavac 3
Bank, the Regional Banks, or the United Nations Development Programme. About a third of all ODA inflows are multilateral.
3
If multilateral aid is effective in promoting human development, it is crucial that it be allocated to the countries which need it most. This study examines the determinants of multilateral aid inflows in sub-Saharan Africa to determine whether it is directed to the least developed countries -those with the worst health and education levels.
I apply a multiple regression on panel data from the 1995-2004 time period to tease out the importance of individual factors on the provision of multilateral aid to subSaharan countries. In particular, I examine the effects of education and health levels, along with institutional quality and population size, on the amount of total multilateral ODA inflows as a proportion of GDP into 22 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. I use adult literacy rates, extrapolated from a UNESCO data set, as proxies for education levels; life expectancy at birth and the infant mortality rate, as given by the World Bank"s World Development Indicators, as a proxies for health levels; and the International Country Risk
Guide measure of corruption within the political system as a proxy for institutional quality.
I hypothesize that, if multilateral aid is directed to the least developed countries, lower inflows of multilateral ODA as a proportion of total GDP will be associated with higher adult literacy rates, a longer life expectancy at birth, and with lower infant mortality rates. Given many multilateral agencies" increased focus on fighting corruption and on the implementation of good policies, one would expect a negative association between higher corruption levels and the amount of aid received. The population explanatory variable controls for possible bias towards less populous countries, which has been documented by some aid allocation studies.
My analysis yields some evidence, especially in time-fixed effects regressions, supportive of the hypothesis that countries with poorer health and education levels receive more multilateral aid as a proportion of their gross domestic products. The corruption level, as estimated by the International Country Risk Guide, on the other hand, appears to have a statistically insignificant effect on the allocation of multilateral ODA.
In this paper, I will first examine the relevant economic studies in the Literature
Review section to provide background information about my study, and to put my contribution into the context of other research that has already been undertaken. After describing my variables and their origins in the Data Sources section, I will then, in the Methodology section, introduce and briefly discuss my regression model. Afterwords, I
will run the regressions, discuss the results, and point out the shortcomings of my analysis in the Results section. Finally, in the concluding section, I will summarize my findings and point out possible directions for future research.
II. Literature Review
We can classify economic research papers about foreign aid into two broad categories -those that deal with the question of aid effectiveness, and those that examine its allocation. Although this paper makes a contribution to the aid allocation literature, it will be enlightening to review literature on aid effectiveness first, as the question of effectiveness is crucial for deciding what kind of aid, and how much of it, should be allocated to individual recipients.
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The effectiveness of foreign aid is the subject of much debate in development economics. Some economists argue that aid does not significantly increase economic growth rates or improve human development indicators (e.g., Boone, 1996) . Others, on the contrary, believe it does, especially when the recipient country implements appropriate policies (e.g., Burnside and Dollar, 2000) . Still others would argue, for example, that the effects of bilateral and multilateral aid are markedly different -while one type may promote growth and development, the other one may not (Ram, 2003; Cassen, 1994; Sender, 1999) .
In a study of ODA data from 1971 to 1990 , Boone (1996 found that most foreign aid had no significant impact on basic development measures such as infant mortality or primary schooling ratios, although some particular programs (immunization and research, for instance) could be effective. His results imply that most foreign aid is consumed rather than invested, and that aid receipts increase the size of the government without influencing health indicators. These discouraging findings constitute, in Boone"s opinion, strong evidence of government failure, whose incentives to improve human development indicators are insufficient, aid inflows notwithstanding.
In a widely cited study, Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that aid has a positive impact on economic growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies, but is rather ineffective when policies are poor. They interpret foreign aid as an income transfer, which can be invested to produce growth, or dissipated in unproductive government expenditure. Their findings indicate that one way to increase the effectiveness of aid would be to make it more systematically conditional on the quality of the recipient countries" policies. Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2006) look at aid allocation during the post-Cold War era. They find that aid has been negatively related to per capita income and positively related to infant mortality, political and civil rights, and government effectiveness. Neither of these studies, however, draws a distinction between bilateral and multilateral aid allocation. I have tried to correct for this deficiency in my study, which focuses exclusively on the allocation of multilateral ODA.
Rather than using a per capita measure, as Wall (1995) does, I have followed the methodology used by Burnside and Dollar (2000) , and looked at multilateral aid as a proportion of gross domestic product.
Turning to institutional quality, Alesina and Weder (2002) 
III. Data Sources
This study examines the effects of education and health levels, as well as of Adult literacy rates (for the Education explanatory variable) were obtained using a dataset published by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The dataset included estimates and projections of adult into the differences in foreign aid allocation policies pre-and post-Cold War. Much of Khadka"s analysis can be applied to other developing countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa. 5 More specifically, as given by the World Bank"s World Development Indicators, an online database of country statistics. 6 Missing life expectancy and mortality rate figures for a specific year were extrapolated using a simple linear function (y=ax+b) which connected the two closest points for which data was available. The extrapolated figures correspond simply to the appropriate points on the resulting straight line. A naïve look at basic statistics provides some preliminary indications of a smallcountry population bias and of a tendency to allocate more aid to countries with high life expectancies and a low mortality rate. Table 1 One should keep in mind, however, that each of these correlations may be affected by the other determinants and that a more sophisticated regression analysis needs to be undertaken to estimate the hypothesized effects.
So far. I have described the character, origins and units of the dependent and independent variables used in my study. I have also pointed out some limitations to their use, especially those derived from the use of extrapolated estimates where exact values are unavailable. In the next section, I explain the methodological framework in which these variables will be put to use. I shall specify my panel regression function, discuss the importance of country-and time-fixed effects, and present my research hypothesis.
IV. Methodology
In this study, I use panel data about 22 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, listed in 9 A proxy variable is, according to Wooldridge (2003) , an observed variable that is related but not identical to an unobserved explanatory variable in a multiple regression analysis. Using proxies is a way to overcome, or at least mitigate, the omitted variables bias. These effects can be introduced into the error term e it through a country-specific intercept γ i : e it = γ i + ε it . In some regressions, I will include both time-and country-specific effects:
e it = α t + γ i + ε it . In all of the above cases the time-and country-specific intercepts can be correlated with the explanatory variables, but the following has to hold:
Population ns Institutio Education Health E  for all i and t.
Life expectancy at birth and adult literacy rates certainly do not capture all aspects of what they proxy for -health and education levels, respectively. These statistics are used by the United Nations Development Programme in their calculations of the HDI index, and seem to provide reasonable approximations.
11 Life expectancy figures are, furthermore, relatively easy to extrapolate for years in which data is not available. One drawback of using life expectancy data is that it tends to remain relatively stable over time and its coefficient can thus be difficult to estimate in a panel regression with timefixed effects. Because of this, a more volatile variable -in particular, the infant mortality rate -was introduced as an alternative proxy for health levels.
11 Although, one should add, the HDI"s education component also factors in combined gross enrollment ratios for primary, secondary and tertiary schools.
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The motivating question underlying my research is whether multilateral aid is allocated to the countries which need it most -those with the worst health and education levels. If this is indeed the case, one would expect a longer life expectancy at birth and greater adult literacy rates to decrease the amount of aid received (β 1 < 0; β 2 < 0).
Negative coefficients for β 1 and β 2 would be consistent with Maizels and Nissanke (1984) who claimed that the recipient need model explained multilateral aid allocation. If we used infant mortality rates instead of life expectancy as a proxy for health levels, we would expect coefficient β 1 to be positive (β 1 > 0), as higher mortality rates would be associated with more multilateral aid.
In light of the multilateral agencies" increased focus on reducing corruption, one may expect more corrupt countries to receive less aid, other things equal (β 3 > 0). Such a finding would be at odds with the results obtained by Alesina and Weder (2002) , who found no evidence that higher corruption levels decreased the amount of aid received.
Previous research indicates that there has been a bias in aid allocation towards less populous countries (β 4 < 0). In their analysis of aid allocation, Burnside and Dollar (2000), for instance, find that population has a large negative coefficient, suggesting that aid goes disproportionately to smaller countries. 
V. Results
I first ran six panel regressions -two with country-fixed, two with time-tixed effects and the last two with both -using the model outlined in the Methodology section.
The resulting coefficient estimates and robust standard errors, as well as some additional statistics such as the number of observations and the adjusted R 2 are summarized in Table 2 below: The coefficients of Health variables, however, were both statistically significant at the 5 percent level, but did not have the expected signs. In regression (1), a one year increase in the average life expectancy lead to a 9.6 increase in Aid/GDP, while in regression (2), a 10 percent rise in the mortality rate was associated with a very minor, 0.35 percent, increase in the amount of multilateral ODA received as a proportion of total GDP. In both regressions, the adjusted R 2 values were in the vicinity of 0.815 for both country-fixed effects regressions, suggesting a fairly good fit.
The following two time-fixed effects panel regression yield some noteworthy results, which largely conform to my research hypothesis and where most of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
In regression (3), an additional year of life expectancy is associated with a 5.3% decline in multilateral Aid/GDP receipts. A 10 percent rise in the literacy rate, moreover, leads to a 20.3% fall in Aid/GDP. Finally, a doubling of a country"s population predicts a 31% decrease in multilateral aid receipts as a proportion of national income.
The results of regression (4) indicate that a 10 percent increase in the mortality rate leads to a 3.6% increase in Aid/GDP, and that a 10 percept rise in the literacy rate is associated with a 17.5% decrease in the receipt of multilateral aid as a proportion of GDP.
If the population of a country doubles, Aid/GDP is expected to decrease by about 29%.
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These results are, to a considerable extent, consistent with my hypothesis.
Countries with poorer health and education levels seem, indeed, on average to receive less multilateral Official Development Assistance as a proportion of their gross domestic products. Furthermore, it appears that there is a fairly strong bias towards providing more aid to countries with smaller populations -a result that is in line with previous findings, such as those in Burnside and Dollar (2000) .
In the case of the Institutions proxy -the absence of corruption variable -, however, my hypothesis does not hold. Its coefficient changes signs across the two timefixed effects regressions. Furthermore, it is not statistically significant in regression (3) and only significant at the 10 percent level in regression (4). To the extent that such a result might indicate that multilateral donors do not factor the perceived level of corruption into their aid allocation decisions, these estimated coefficients could validate Alesina and Weder"s (2002) findings that corruption does not reduce foreign aid receipts.
Although the two time-fixed panel regressions yield statistically significant coefficients, their adjusted R 2 is very low -only around 0.19. Such low values indicate that the panel regression overall does not fit the sample data well, and that other factorsperhaps country-specific qualities that remain constant across time -might be important.
The results are, nevertheless, very telling. Without taking into account the presumably large influence of country-fixed effects, we find that the results of regressions (3) and (4) are supportive, on a statistically significant level, of the research hypothesis.
The final two regressions summarized in Table 3 combine country-and timefixed effects. The only coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in Hlavac 21 both regressions (5) and (6) is the estimated elasticity of Aid/GDP in response to changes in Population. In regression (5), if a country"s population doubled, Aid/GDP would rise eightfold, whereas in regression (6), the doubling of a country"s population is associated with an eleven-fold increase. Not only do these coefficients not support the small-country bias hypothesis, the elasticity also seems unrealistically high. In regression (6), the mortality rate coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and indicates that a 10 percent increase in a country"s mortality rate would lead to a very meager, 0.38 percent, decrease in Aid/GDP. The life expectancy and literacy rate coefficients are not statistically significant in either equation, but they have the expected signs. The absence of corruption coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level in both regressions, and it
indicates that a one point increase on the International Country Risk Guide scale would lead to an 18.3% decrease in Aid/GDP in regression (5), but only a 1.8% decline in regression (6). The combined country-and time-fixed effects regressions display a very good fit to the sample data, as their adjusted R 2 statistics hover around 0.84.
Across the six panel regressions discussed above, one coefficient that was often not statistically significant and tended to change signs is that of the absence of corruption variable. I have therefore decided to drop it from the regression model and to reestimate the model. As before, I ran six regressions with various combinations of country-fixed and time-fixed effects. The results are summarized in Table 4 , which follows: Regressions ( sign, indicating that populous countries tend to receive more multilateral ODA as a proportion of their national income. This is at odds with Burnside and Dollar"s (2000) finding of a small-country population bias. The adjusted R 2 is around 0.81 for both regressions, suggesting a good fit.
The following two time-fixed effects panel regressions (3) and (4) Hlavac 24 Regressions (5) and (6) combine country-and time-fixed effects. Estimates of the population elasticity of Aid/GDP are statistically significant at the 10 or 5 percent level in both equations, and they indicate a rather implausibly large multilateral aid allocation bias in favor of countries with large populations. In regression (5), the doubling of a country"s population would lead to a 8.5-fold increase in Aid/GDP, and in regression (6), the increase would be almost 12-fold. Needless to say, these findings are not consistent
with Burnside and Dollar"s (2000) observation that less populous countries receive, ceteris paribus, more foreign aid than more populous ones. Health variables do not have the expected signs, although only the mortality rate coefficient is statistically significant.
Regression (5) suggests that, if the life expectancy of a country"s inhabitants went up by one year, one would expect Aid/GDP to rise by 3.2 percent, whereas regression (6) indicates that a ten percent rise in the mortality rate is associated with a 0.35 percent decline in multilateral ODA receipts in proportion to GDP. The literacy rate coefficient, which in both cases has a sign opposite to that which was expected, is not statistically significant in either regression. According to regression (5), a ten point increase in the literacy rate would yield a 54 percent increase in Aid/GDP, whereas in regression (6), the increase would amount to as much as 77 percent. The combined country-and time-fixed effects regressions appear to explain a great deal of variation in the data, as the adjusted R 2 is as high as approximately 0.83 for both.
Overall, it appears that the panel regressions with both country-and time-fixed effects provide the best fit to the sample data. The estimated coefficients, however, were mostly not statistically significant and only rarely supported the research hypothesis.
Regressions where only time-fixed effects were included yielded statistically significant Hlavac 25 results that, by and large, conformed to the research hypothesis. The adjusted R 2 statistic was, however, relatively low and indicated a rather poor fit without including countryfixed effects.
In light of these results, it seems appropriate to conclude that the analysis provides at least some evidence that confirms the research hypothesis. In other words, there is some evidence -especially in the time-fixed effects regressions -that, in sub-Saharan Africa, more multilateral Official Development Assistance as a proportion of GDP is allocated to countries with lower health and education levels. Corruption, however, does not seem to be a significant factor in aid allocation decisions. The lack of clear-cut results and statistical significance in regressions that include country-fixed effects, can be attributed to the relatively low number of observations, given the multitude of regressors. Another issue that could arise in connection with my regression equations is the problem of reverse causality. Throughout my analysis, I have assumed that the variation in allocated multilateral ODA was caused by the differences in the explanatory variables.
The causation could, however, plausibly run the other way. Some of the explanatory variables could be affected by aid receipts -especially if multilateral aid is effective in promoting economic and human development. An increase in received multilateral ODA could, in this scenario, improve the country"s inhabitants" health levels, leading to lower mortality rates.
Especially in regressions which include country-fixed effects, the number of observations is relatively small compared to the number of regressors. This leads to inconclusive results and a lack of statistical significance in some regressions. In regressions where only time-fixed effects were included, however, the obtained coefficients were statistically significant and had the expected sign, but the adjusted R 2 statistic was too low for a reasonably good fit, indicating a large role for country-fixed effects. These results provide, without accounting for the extensive country-fixed effects, at least some empirical support for the research.
All in all, my analysis yields some evidence in support of the hypothesis that countries with poorer health and education levels receive more multilateral aid as a proportion of their gross domestic products. The corruption level, as measured by the International Country Risk Guide, however, appears to be an unimportant factor in the allocation of multilateral ODA.
The shortcomings of my analysis include the low number of observations, the potential presence of omitted variable bias, issues of reverse causality, and the possible imprecision of coefficient estimates based on extrapolated values of explanatory variables.
These imperfections represent, in my view, an opportunity for further research. One could, for example, try to obtain a greater number of observations as well as more accurate, rather than merely extrapolated, values of the explanatory variables, or include additional regressors to deal with omitted variable bias, and then redo the panel regression analysis to obtain more conclusive results. One could also undertake a more detailed study of the decision-making processes in the multilateral agencies themselves to ascertain whether multilateral ODA is allocated based on health and education variables, 
